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Abstract
Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon
emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the
interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the activation
of spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms, which may lead them to behave cooper-
atively, while interacting with others and taking conflicting decisions over time. By
extending Evolutionary game theory over networks, we prove that cooperation par-
tially or fully emerges whether self-regulating mechanisms are sufficiently stronger
than social pressure. Interestingly, even few cooperative individuals act as catalyz-
ing agents for the cooperation of others, thus activating a recruiting mechanism,
eventually driving the whole population to cooperate.
Cooperation in human populations is a fundamental phenomenon, which has fasci-
nated many scientists working in different fields, such as biology, sociology, economics,
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], and, more recently, engineering [7, 8, 9]. Actually, in the analysis of
social dilemmas, such as the prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperation is often assumed to be
the result of suitable norms [10, 11] and punishment mechanisms [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
Further approaches claim that cooperation emerges from other factors, such as reputation
[18, 19], synergy and discounting [20], social diversity [21] and positive interactions [22].
Mathematical models tackling the problem of cooperation are typically grounded on
evolutionary game theory, where a population of individuals taking part in a game re-
peated over time is considered. Each individual decides to be Cooperative (C) or Defective
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(D) when playing one or more two-players games with other individuals. Eventually he
obtains a given payoff, and may decide to opt for changing his strategy. In a generic
two-players game, R is the reward when both cooperate, T is the temptation to defect
when the opponent cooperates, S is the sucker’s payoff earned by a cooperative player
when the opponent is a free rider, and P < R is the punishment for mutual defection.
The social dilemma arises when the temptation to defect is stronger than the reward
for cooperation (T > R), and the punishment for defection is preferred to the sucker’s
payoff (P > S). This scheme is known as prisoner’s dilemma game, and it well describes
many real world situations, occuring in fields like environmental protection, biology, psy-
chology, international politics, economics and so on. In all these cases, defectors earn a
higher payoff than unconditional cooperators. As a consequence, cooperators are doomed
to extinction. This fact has been proven to be true for both the deterministic setting of
the replicator equation and for stochastic game dynamics of finite populations, assuming
that players are equally likely to interact with each other [23, 24, 25]. Interestingly, a
consistent part of the recent literature [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33] showed that the
networked structure of the population may favor the emergence of cooperation.
In this work, we consider members of a social network. To be realistic, these indi-
viduals may choose to be 100% cooperative, 100% defective, as in the standard case, or
also fuzzy strategies, such as 50%−50% cooperative/defective. More interestingly, in this
study cooperation is shown to be promoted by spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms,
according to the idea that humans seem to have an innate tendency to cooperate with
one another even when it goes against their rational self-interest, as pointed out by Vogel
in [34]. Specifically, self-regulation is modeled as an inertial term and the resulting effects
on the population dynamics are extensively analyzed both theoretically and by means of
numerical simulations.
Consider a social network defined as a finite population of players v = {1, . . . , N},
arranged on a directed graph described by adjacency matrix A = {av,w}, where av,w = 1
if player v is influenced by player w, and 0 otherwise. The in-degree kv =
∑N
w=1 av,w of a
player represents the number of neighbors of the generic player v. At each time instant
a player can choose his own level of cooperation, indicated by xv ∈ [0, 1], to play kv two-
persons games with all his neighbors. Notice that xv = 1 represents full cooperation (C),
xv = 0 means full defection (D), and xv ∈ (0, 1) stands for a partial level of cooperation.
Accordingly, when any two connected players v and w take part in a game, the payoff for
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v is defined by the continuous function φ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R:
φ(xv, xw) = [xv, 1− xv]
[
R S
T P
] [
xw
1− xw
]
. (1)
Notice that for xv, xw ∈ {0, 1}, we recover the payoffsR, T , S and P previously introduced.
Player’s v payoff φv collected over the network is the sum of all outcomes of two-player
games with neighbors. Formally, the payoff function φv : [0, 1]
N → R is defined as follows:
φv(x) =
N∑
w=1
av,wφ(xv, xw), (2)
where x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
>. Player v is able to appraise whether a change of his strat-
egy xv produces an improvement of his payoff φv. Indeed, if the derivative of φv with
respect to xv is positive (negative), the player would like to increase (decrease) his level
of cooperation. Of course, when the derivative is null, then the player has no incentive to
change his mind. This mechanism is modeled by the EGN equation [35, 36], which reads
as follows:
x˙v = xv(1− xv)∂φv
∂xv
, (3)
where the sign of x˙v depends only on the term ∂φv/∂xv, since xv(1− xv) ≥ 0. Unlike the
standard replicator equation, which deals with the distribution of strategies over a well
mixed population, where players are indistinguishable except for their strategies, the EGN
is a system of ODEs, each one describing the strategy evolution of the specific player v
(when dealing with more than two strategies, the dimension of the ODE system increases
accordingly). Following equation (2), the derivative of the payoff φv is:
∂φv
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w
∂φ(xv, xw)
∂xv
.
Moreover, from equation (1) we get that:
∂φ(xv, xw)
∂xv
= (R− T + P − S)xw − (P − S) = (σC + σD)xw − σD, (4)
where σC = R − T and σD = P − S [37]. For the specific case of a strict prisoner’s
dilemma game, σC < 0 and σD > 0. According to [28] and [38], unilateral defection is
preferred to mutual cooperation when σC < 0, while σD > 0 indicates the preference for
mutual defection over unilateral cooperation. When the effect of σC is stronger than σD
3
(|σC | > σD), the game is more influenced by temptation (hereafter called T-driven game),
while in the other case (|σC | < σD) punishment is more effective, and hence the game
will be called P-driven. Since σC < 0 and σD > 0, we have that ∂φ(xv, xw)/∂xv ≤ 0 for
all xw ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, also ∂φv/∂xv ≤ 0 and then x˙v ≤ 0, showing that the level of
cooperation decreases over time towards full defection.
As reported in equation (3), ∂φv/∂xv depends only on the state of neighboring play-
ers, not on the current state xv of player v himself. On the contrary, the willingness
to pursue cooperation as a greater good follows from internal mechanisms correlated to
personal awareness and culture. These mechanisms should act as inertial terms able to
reduce the rational temptation to defect, depending on the current strategy xv of player
himself. Generally, this aspect is not taken into account in the mathematical modeling,
even though it normally characterizes complex individuals like humans [34].
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defectors
(b) Full defectors (c) No defectors (d) Full cooperators
Figure 1: Cooperation distribution over a social network. (a) Coexistence of full cooperators
(yellow circles), partial cooperators (orange circles) and full defectors (red circles). (b) Population
composed only by full defectors. This state is the N -dimensional vector x∗ALLD = [0, 0, . . . , 0]. (c) No
full defectors are present within the population. (d) Population composed only by full cooperators. This
state is the N -dimensional vector x∗ALLC = [1, 1, . . . , 1]. Configurations reported in (c) and (d) represent
cooperative steady states (i.e. xv > 0 ∀v).
To fill this gap, in this paper internal mechanisms are introduced in the EGN equation
by adding a term fv balancing ∂φv/∂xv. This term is weighted by a parameter βv which
measures the inertia of a player with respect to his neighbors’ actions [9]. The extended
Self-Regulated EGN equation, hereafter called SR-EGN, is reported in Figure 2. Notice
that full cooperative x∗ALLC = [1, 1, . . . , 1]
>, full defective x∗ALLD = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
>, and fuzzy
configurations x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
N ]
> with x∗v > 0 for at least one v, are steady states of
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the SR-EGN equation (see Figure 1). Further details on steady states are reported in
Appendix A.
External feedback
Internal feedback
SR-EGN equation
Figure 2: SR-EGN equation. The strategy dynamics of player v (green node) is ruled by the SR-EGN
equation (green box). It includes two terms: the external feedback term (blue box) ∂φv/∂xv, accounting
for the external mechanisms related to game interactions (blue arrows) with the kv neighbors (black
nodes), and the internal feedback term (orange box) βvfv, modeling the self regulating processes of node
v (the orange self loop).
Inspired by self-regulation in animal societies [39], the term βvfv is modeled as an
internal feedback describing a virtual game that each individual plays against himself,
i.e. a self game. This game is characterized by the same parameters σC and σD of the
two-player games. Therefore, the self-regulating function f(v) is written as:
fv = (σC + σD)xv − σD. (5)
Notice that fv is similar to equation (4), where xw has been replaced by xv, thus conceiv-
ing the individual v himself as one of his own “opponents”. “What kind of outcome can I
earn if I apply a given strategy to myself?”: a generic player in our model can be aware of
the conflicting context where he participates, and he may know the importance of coop-
eration as a primal objective to be pursued. Remarkably, this term models a spontaneous
5
learning process, thus representing a time varying feature of each individual.
The complete SR-EGN equation studied in this paper can be rewritten as follows:
x˙v = xv(1− xv) [kv ((σC + σD)x¯v − σD)− βv ((σC + σD)xv − σD)] , (6)
where x¯v = (1/kv)
∑N
w=1 av,wxw is the average player resulting from the decisions of all
neighboring players of v. Besides σC and σD, the two fundamental parameters of this
model are kv and βv. kv is the in-degree of player v, thus accounting for the influence of
the network (external feedback) on his decision. The second parameter is the weighting
factor βv modulating self-regulation. When βv = 0, the individual is somehow “member
of the flock”, since his strategy changes only according to the outcome variations of game
interactions with neighbors, embodied by ∂φv/∂xv. In this case, we recover the standard
EGN equation (3), and defection is unavoidable. Positive values of βv represent an “aware
resistance” of players to the external feedback.
The main result of this paper is that SR-EGN equation can explain the emergence of
cooperation in a social network. More specifically, when the awareness is stronger than
the level of connectivity of each player, i.e. βv > kv, then state x
∗
ALLC is an attractor for
the dynamics of the population, as well as a Nash equilibrium [35] of the complete game,
while at the same time total defection x∗ALLD is repulsive. Furthermore, when
βv > ρkv, (7)
where ρ = |σC/σD| ≥ 1 for a T-driven game and ρ = |σD/σC | ≥ 1 for a P-driven game,
then x∗ALLC is a global attractor. In other words, starting from any initial strategy
xv(t = 0) > 0 ∀v, all players will eventually become full cooperators. These results are
formally proved in the Appendix B. Notice that convincing individuals with high degree
kv to be cooperative requires potentially large values of βv. Anyway, in the following we
show that cooperation may be also achieved for smaller value of βv.
In Figure 3 the value of x˙v is reported with colors as a function of βv/kv and xv, together
with the attracting (black circles) and repulsive (white circles) steady states for player v.
Arrows are used to depict the direction of the dynamics. The derivative x˙v is analyzed for
both a cooperative (x¯v = 1, Figures 3A and 3B) and a defective (x¯v = 0, Figures 3C and
3D) neighborhood sets. The interesting region of all graphs is βv/kv < ρ, in which the
values of the parameters are below the theoretical threshold (7). In all cases, the smaller is
this ratio, the lower is the probability to cooperate, while the higher is the ratio, the higher
is the probability to cooperate. For intermediate values (1/ρ < βv/kv < ρ), the formation
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Figure 3: Flow of the SR-EGN equation. Colors represent the value of the derivative x˙v as a
function of xv and βv/kv. Black and white circles correspond to attractive and repulsive steady states
for player v, respectively. Arrows are used to schematically highlight the direction of the dynamics. The
flow for a player v connected only to full cooperators (x¯v = 1) in T-driven game (σC = −2 and σD = 1)
and in P-driven game (σC = −1 and σD = 2) are reported in subplots A and B, respectively. Instead,
the case of a player connected only to full defectors (x¯v = 0) is shown in subplots C (T-driven) and D
(P-driven). Vertical blue lines are depicted for βv/kv = 1/ρ, βv/kv = 1 and βv/kv = ρ. The intermediate
steady states corresponding to partial levels of cooperation are always located between 1/ρ and ρ.
of steady states corresponding to partial levels of cooperation is observed. These steady
states separate the regions where defection or cooperation dominates. For the T-driven
games (Figures 3A and 3C), these new equilibria are repulsive, thus creating bistable
7
Figure 4: Average distribution of strategies and convergence speed. For different graph topolo-
gies (ER and SF), 500 graphs with N = 100 nodes and average degree k¯ = 10 are considered. Initial
conditions are randomly chosen in the set (0, 1). For a T-driven game (σC = −2 and σD = 1) and a
P-driven game (σC = −1 and σD = 2), and for different values of the parameter βv = β ∈ {0, . . . , 20} ∀v,
the SR-EGN equation is simulated system until a steady state is reached. The average distribution of
strategies of the whole population, dividing it into 3 subgroups, is reported: defectors in red (x∗v < 10
−4),
partial cooperators in orange (10−4 ≤ x∗v ≤ 1 − 10−4) and full cooperators in yellow (x∗v > 1 − 10−4).
The hatched area represent the average percentage of population for which the theoretical rule βv > ρkv
is satisfied. The superposed blue lines represent the convergence speed, experimentally estimated as the
inverse of the time required to the population for reaching the steady state.
dynamics which leads player to cooperate or defect according to their initial conditions.
Moreover, the probability to cooperate raises for increasing values of βv or decreasing the
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in-degree. Notice that, since the temptation is prominent for this game, if x¯v moves from
1 (Figure 3A) to 0 (Figure 3C), the region of partial steady states exists for lower values
of βv/kv, thus easing cooperation. On the other hand, for P-driven games (Figures 3B
and 3D), the fuzzy steady states are attractive, thus ensuring at least a certain level of
cooperation also in the intermediate region. Interestingly, since the punishment is strong,
the presence of cooperators in the neighborhood facilitates the convergence to a cooper-
ative state. Specifically, if x¯v moves from 1 (Figure 3B) to 0 (Figure 3D), the region of
partial steady states exists for higher values of βv/kv, thus preventing cooperation. This
phenomenon will be explained better in the following experiments.
Figure 3 shows that, from the single player’s point of view, cooperation is also feasible
for values of βv below the theoretical threshold (7). For completeness, the behavior of
the whole population is studied by means of numerical simulations. We investigate the
probability for a population to be cooperative by running 500 simulations of different
random networks (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) and Scale-Free (SF)) with N = 100 and average
degree k¯ = 10 (and thus the average in-degree is also 10). Moreover, all individuals share
the same self-regulating factor βv = β ∈ {0, . . . , 20}. This experiment has been repeated
for T-driven and P-driven games, using initial conditions randomly generated for each
simulation.
In Figure 4 the percentages of full defectors (red area), partial cooperators (orange
area) and full cooperators (yellow area) at steady state are reported as a function of β.
The fraction of individuals who satisfy the theorem (7) is highlighted with the hatched
pattern. Notice that the number of defectors decreases by increasing β. Consistently with
the results shown in Figure 3, bistable behavior is observed for T-driven game (Figures 4A
and 4C), for which the population splits into two groups of full defectors and full coopera-
tors. Partial cooperation (orange area) is present for P-driven game (Figures 4B and 4D).
According to the results shown in Figures 3B and 3D, where the presence of cooperative
neighborhood fosters cooperation for single players, we observe the same phenomenon in
Figures 4B and 4D, extended to the whole population. In particular, the presence of even
few cooperators is able to recruit their neighboring players to switch their strategies from
defection to cooperation. Increasing β, these players, together with those satisfying the
threshold (7), are able to recruit to cooperation an increasing number of individuals. The
average convergence speed of the system to a steady state, reported by blue lines, shows
a slowdown of the dynamics for intermediate values of β. Specifically, this occurs when a
small fraction of cooperators appears in the population, until a sufficiently large number
of individuals start to cooperate, thus accelerating significantly the dynamics.
Additionally, the relationship between βv and kv is highlighted in Figure 5 where β
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Figure 5: Selfishness and altruism within heterogeneous populations. Steady steady state con-
figurations for T-driven (subplot A) and P-driven (subplot B) games. The results have been obtained by
simulating the SR-EGN equation for 500 realizations of a SF network, composed by N = 100 individuals,
with average degree k¯ = 10. The self regulation parameter is set to β = 15 for all players. The transition
from green to blue to magenta indicates the social role of players in the graphs, thus allowing to distin-
guish between non central players (green dots), intermediate player (blue dots) and hubs (magenta dots).
The vertical dashed lines highlight this distinction. The grey lines represent the degree distribution of
the networks. Subplots C and D report the indicator cv introduced in equation (8), for the T-driven and
P-driven games, respectively.
is set to 15, and SF networks are used. For each player, a circle represents the reached
steady state as a function of his in-degree (Figures 5A and 5B). In the same subplots,
the degree distributions of networks is depicted in gray. Players with low degree (green
dots), representing non-central individuals, converge towards a cooperative steady state.
On the other hand, hub players (magenta dots), always prefer defection. Players with
intermediate in-degree (blue dots) show different behaviors for the T-driven and P-driven
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games. Specifically, these players split into two subgroups showing different behaviors
(some full cooperators and some full defectors, see Figure 5A). Figure 5B shows that
these type of players reach a partial level of cooperation. The distinction of the three
groups is highlighted by the dashed vertical black lines.
In order to quantify the difference between the level of cooperation of player v and the
average cooperation of his neighbors at steady state, the following quantitative indicator
is introduced:
cv = x
∗
v −
1
kv
N∑
w=1
av,wx
∗
w. (8)
If cv > 0, then player v is altruistic, since his level of cooperation is higher than the
average of his neighbors, while cv < 0 indicates more selfish behaviors. The group of non
central players is always more altruistic than hubs. The intermediate players are again
splitted into altruist and selfish for T-driven game (Figure 5C), while for P-driven game
(Figure 5D), this distinction vanishes, and a continuous distribution of altruist and selfish
persons is observed.
Joining the results of Figures 3, 4 and 5, we conclude that some individuals are more
sensitive and aware on their internal mechanisms, thus becoming cooperative for lower
self-regulating factors, and exhibiting a more altruistic behavior. In particular, for the
P-driven game, these receptive individuals catalyze the others to cooperate.
Appendix A The Evolutionary Game equation on Net-
works (EGN) and self games
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of players. Each player is placed in a vertex of a
directed graph, defined by the adjacency matrix A = {av,w} ∈ {0, 1}N×N with (v, w) ∈ V2.
Specifically, av,w = 1 when v is connected with w, 0 otherwise. It is also assumed that
av,v = 0. The degree of player v is defined as the cardinality of his neighborhood, namely:
kv =
N∑
w=1
av,w.
In the literature on evolutionary game theory, it is assumed that, at each time, one
individual uses a pure strategy in a given set while playing games with connected individ-
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uals. For the specific topic of cooperation, these games are often modeled as Prisoner’s
dilemma games: the set of pure strategies contains only two elements, cooperation (C)
and defection (D), and the outcome is described by the following payoff matrix:
B =
[
R S
T P
]
,
where R is the reward when both players cooperate, T is the temptation to defect
when the opponent cooperates, S is the sucker’s payoff earned by a cooperative player
when the opponent defects, and P is the punishment for mutual defection. More specifi-
cally, for a Prisoner’s dilemma game, the reward is a better outcome than the punishment
(R > P ), the temptation payoff is higher than the reward (T > R), and the punishment
is preferred to the sucker’s payoff (P > S). It is useful to define σC = R − T < 0 and
σD = P − S > 0 [37], allowing us to distinguish two cases: when the effect of σC is
stronger than σD (|σC | > σD) we will refer to a T-driven game, while the opposite situa-
tion (|σC | < σD) is hereafter called P-driven game.
In the present work, a more realistic scenario is investigated, where one player can
choose his own level of cooperation, instead of just C or D. The level of cooperation of a
generic player v, is denoted by the real number xv ∈ [0, 1]; specifically, xv = 1 stands for
a player exhibiting maximum cooperativeness, while xv = 0 represents a full defector. All
other shades (i.e. xv ∈ (0, 1)) denote partial levels of cooperation. In this new framework,
when any two connected players v and w take part in a game, the payoff for v is defined
by the continuous bilinear function φ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R:
φ(xv, xw) = [xv, 1− xv]B
[
xw
1− xw
]
= (R− T + P − S)xvxw − (P − S)xv − (P − T )xw + P.
Moreover, notice that xv, xw ∈ {0, 1}, we recover the payoffs R, T , S and P .
The total payoff of player v is the sum of all outcomes of two-player games with
neighbors. Formally, the payoff function φv : [0, 1]
N → R is defined as follows:
φv(x) =
N∑
w=1
av,wφ(xv, xw),
where x is the vector of all the xv variables. Moreover, given the vector x, we define the
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following payoff of pure strategies C (xv = 1) and D (xv = 0):
pCv (x) =
N∑
w=1
av,wφ(1, xw) =
N∑
w=1
av,w((R− S)xw + S)
pDv (x) =
N∑
w=1
av,wφ(0, xw) =
N∑
w=1
av,w((T − P )xw + P )
.
Following [35, 36], the EGN equation for two-strategy games reads as follows:
x˙v = xv(1− xv)∆pv(x), (9)
where
∆pv(x) = p
C
v (x)− pDv (x) =
N∑
w=1
av,w(R− T + P − S)xw − (P − S))
=
N∑
w=1
av,w((σC + σD)xw − σD).
It is clear that the level of cooperation of player v increases (decreases) when ∆pv(x)
is positive (negative). In other words, the player v will be more cooperative over time as
long as the payoff he can earn using the pure strategy C is better than the payoff he can
earn using the pure strategy D.
This comparative evaluation of the benefits provided by the available strategies can be
represented in an alternative way. Specifically, suppose that player v is able to appraise
whether a change of his strategy xv produces an improvement of his payoff φv. This means
that, if the derivative of φv with respect to xv is positive (negative), the player would like
to increase (decrease) his level of cooperation. Interestingly, the following result holds:
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∂φv(x)
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w
∂φ(xv, xw)
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w ((R− T + P − S)xw − (P − S)) ,
=
N∑
w=1
av,w ((σC + σD)xw − σD) ,
= ∆pv(x).
Thus, the EGN equation (9) can be rewritten as follows:
x˙v = xv(1− xv)∂φv(x)
∂xv
. (10)
It is worthwhile to notice that, while the replicator equation is used to describe the
dynamics of population where strategies correspond to the phenotypes of the individuals,
its extension on graphs, the EGN equation, is suitable for analyzing the dynamics of indi-
viduals arranged on a network, which are able to choose their strategies in the continuous
set [0, 1].
The EGN equation (10), as well as most of the models presented in the literature,
assumes that the strategy dynamics of a generic player v is driven only by external factors.
Indeed, ∂φv
∂xv
depends only on the state of neighboring players, not on the current state xv
of player v himself. Inspired by mechanisms describing self-regulation in animal societies
reported in [39], we overcome this issue by introducing the Self-Regulated EGN equation
(SR-EGN); this new model is obtained by adding a self-regulating term fv to the EGN
equation, balancing the external feedback ∂φv
∂xv
, thus reading as follows:
x˙v = xv(1− xv)
(
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv)
)
, (11)
where the parameter βv is used to tune the effectiveness of the introduced self-regulation
mechanism. Specifically, we assume that this self-regulation term embodies a game that
a given individual plays against himself. To describe this self game, consider two generic
players which strategies are y and z, both belonging to the set [0, 1]. As already mentioned,
the first player can assess whether a change of his strategy y can lead to an improvement
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of the payoff φ(y, z). In particular, the assessment is based on the sign of the partial
derivative
∂φ(y, z)
∂y
= (σC + σD)z − σD.
In the particular case of individuals representing both the first and second player at the
same time, the derivative reads as follows:
∂φ(y, z)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=z=xv
= (σC + σD)xv − σD.
Therefore, the self-regulating term is defined as:
fv(xv) =
∂φ(y, z)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=z=xv
= (σC + σD)xv − σD.
It is worthwhile to notice that the time derivative of xv in (11) depends on xv in the
term accounting for the self game. Thus, the self game introduces a feedback mechanism
regulated by the parameter βv ∈ R. In particular, in equation (11), βv > 0 represents a
negative feedback, βv < 0 stands for a positive feedback, while βv = 0 refers to situations
where the player v does not play a self game.
A.1 Steady states and linearization
A steady state x∗ is a solution of equation (11) satisfying x˙v = 0 ∀v ∈ V . In order to be
feasible, the components of a steady state must belong to the set [0, 1]. Formally, the
set of feasible steady states is:
Θ = {x∗ ∈ RN : x˙∗v = 0 ∧ x∗v ∈ [0, 1] ∀v ∈ V}.
It is clear that all points such that for all v, x∗v = 0 or x
∗
v = 1 are in the set Θ. They are
the 2N pure steady states. We remark that set Θ may contain also other steady states,
exhibiting fuzzy levels of cooperation. Particularly relevant are the pure steady states
x∗ALLC = [1, 1, . . . , 1]
>,
and
x∗ALLD = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
>.
Indeed, they represent a population composed by full cooperators and full defectors,
respectively, and thus they describe the spread of cooperation and its extinction in a given
15
population.
The dynamical properties of these two pure steady states is fundamental for the emer-
gence of cooperation. In particular, their stability can be analyzed by linearizing system
(11) near them.
The Jacobian matrix of system (10), J(x) = {jv,w(x)}, is defined as follows:
jv,w(x) =
∂x˙v
∂xw
=

xv(1− xv)(σC + σD), if av,w = 1
(1− 2xv)
(
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv)
)
− βvxv(1− xv)(σC + σD), if w = v
0, otherwise
.
It is easy to show that the Jacobian matrix reduces to a diagonal one for both x∗ALLC
and x∗ALLD. Moreover, observe that:
∂φv(x
∗
ALLC)
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w((σC + σD) · 1− σD) =
N∑
w=1
av,wσC = kvσC ,
∂φv(x
∗
ALLD)
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w((σC + σD) · 0− σD) = −
N∑
w=1
av,wσD = −kvσD,
fv(1) = (σC + σD · 1− σD) = σC ,
fv(0) = (σC + σD · 0− σD) = −σD.
Therefore, we have that:
jv,v(x
∗
ALLC) = (1− 2 · 1)
(
∂φv(x
∗
ALLC)
∂xv
− βvfv(1)
)
= −σC(kv − βv)
for x∗ALLC , and
jv,v(x
∗
ALLD) = (1− 2 · 0)
(
∂φv(x
∗
ALLD)
∂xv
− βvfv(0)
)
= −σD(kv − βv)
for x∗ALLD.
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Appendix B Emergence of cooperation in the EGN
equation with self-regulations
The emergence of cooperation is reached when all the members of a social network turn
their strategies to cooperation. Therefore, the asymptotic stability of x∗ALLC , as well as
the instability of x∗ALLD, has a fundamental role in this context. In order to study the
stability of steady states x∗ALLC and x
∗
ALLD, we start by analyzing their linear stability.
Moreover, an appropriate Lyapunov function is proposed, which prove that x∗ALLC is also
globally asymptotically stable, thus guarantying the emergence of cooperation.
B.1 Asymptotic stability of x∗ALLC
Recall that the spectrum of J(x∗) characterizes the linear stability of any steady state x∗
[40]. Therefore, the role of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J(x∗) is fundamental
to tackle the problem of the emergence of cooperation.
The following results hold.
Theorem 1. If βv > kv ∀v ∈ V, then x∗ALLC is asymptotically stable.
Proof. As shown before, the Jacobian matrix evaluated for x∗ALLC is diagonal. Then, the
elements on the diagonal of the Jacobian matrix correspond to its eigenvalues and they
are defined as follows:
jv,v(x
∗
ALLC) = λv = −σC(kv − βv).
Using the fact that βv > kv ∀v ∈ V , and σC < 0, all the eigenvalues are negative.
Thus, x∗ALLC is asymptotically stable.
Theorem 2. If ∃v ∈ V : βv > kv, then x∗ALLD is unstable.
Proof. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix relative to the steady state x∗ALLD are
jv,v(x
∗
ALLD) = λv = −σD(kv − βv).
If the hypothesis of the theorem are fulfilled, since σD > 0, then there is at least one
positive eigenvalue, implying that x∗ALLD is an unstable steady state.
These results are summarized as follows: defection dominates over cooperation. Then,
if the system does not present any internal feedback mechanism (i.e. βv = 0 ∀v ∈ V),
the whole social network will converge to x∗ALLD (cooperation vanishes). Anyway, using
βv > kv for all the members of the population, x
∗
ALLD is destabilized and x
∗
ALLC becomes
attractive.
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B.2 Global asymptotic stability of x∗ALLC
Theorems 1 and 2 prove that under suitable condition, x∗ALLC is asymptotically stable
and x∗ALLD is unstable. Anyway, this is not sufficient to prove emergence of cooperation.
Indeed, there can be some other steady states in Θ which may be also attractive. Nev-
ertheless, a Lyapunov function for the steady state x∗ALLC on the set x ∈ (0, 1]N can be
found [42].
Adapting the approach presented in [37, 41] to the SR-EGN equation, we consider the
following function:
V (x) = −
N∑
v=1
log(xv),
for x ∈ (0, 1]N . Notice that V (x∗ALLC) = 0, and V (x) > 0 ∀x 6= x∗ALLC .
Moreover, the time derivative of V (x) is defined as follows:
V˙ (x) =
∂V (x)
∂t
=
N∑
v=1
∂V (x)
∂xv
x˙v =
= −
N∑
v=1
1
xv
xv(1− xv)
(
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv)
)
=
=
N∑
v=1
(xv − 1)
(
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv)
)
. (12)
Finally, it is clear that V˙ (x∗ALLC) = 0.
Starting from these premises, if V˙ (x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]N \ {x∗ALLC}, then V (x) is
a Lyapunov function.
Let’s introduce the following quantities:
ψ = inf
y∈(0,1]
(σC + σD)y − σD, (13)
ξ = sup
y∈(0,1]
(σC + σD)y − σD, (14)
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and
ρ =
ψ
ξ
.
Notice that, since σC < 0 and σD > 0, then both ψ and ξ are negative. Indeed,
• for a T-driven game, since |σC | > σD, then ψ = σC and ξ = −σD;
• for a P-driven game, since |σC | < σD, then ψ = −σD and ξ = σC .
Then, we conclude that ρ is a positive number if both cases, and, in particular, it is:
ρ =
ψ
ξ
=

∣∣∣∣σCσD
∣∣∣∣ for T-driven games
∣∣∣∣σDσC
∣∣∣∣ for P-driven games.
The following result holds.
Theorem 3. If βv > ρkv ∀v ∈ V, then V (x) is a Lyapunov function.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that:
∂φv(x)
∂xv
=
N∑
w=1
av,w((σC + σD)xw − σD) ≥
N∑
w=1
av,wψ = kvψ. (15)
Similarly, since βv > 0, we get that:
βvfv(xv) = βv((σC + σD)xv − σD) ≤ βvξ. (16)
Joining (15) and (16) together, we get that:
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv) ≥ kvψ − βvξ.
Moreover, notice that:
βv > ρkv ⇒ βv > ψ
ξ
kv ⇒ kvψ − βvξ > 0,
and hence
∂φv(x)
∂xv
− βvfv(xv) > 0 ∀v ∈ V . (17)
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According to equations (12) and (17), since xv − 1 < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]N \ {x∗ALLC},
we guarantee that V˙ (x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1]N \ {x∗ALLC}. Hence, V (x) is a Lyapunov
function.
Figure 6: Payoff, flow and dynamics. Value of the two-player game payoff φ(xv, xw), and corre-
sponding flow of the SR-EGN equation in the phase space (xv, xw) for different values of βv. Subplots A,
B and C: T-driven game (σC = −2 and σD = 1); subplot D: P-driven game (σC = −1 and σD = 2). Red
and yellow circles represent the steady states x∗ALLD and x
∗
ALLC , respectively. For each case, the corre-
sponding dynamics for a population of N = 100 players arranged on a scale-free network with average
degree k¯ = 10 is depicted below, where initial conditions are randomly chosen in the set (0, 1). Results
for βv = 0 and βv > ρkv in the T-driven game are similar to the P-driven game, thus not reported here.
Figure 6 compares the above theoretical results to the standard case (βv = 0), by
showing the flow in phase space of EGN and SR-EGN equations, and the corresponding
time course of the cooperation level for a population of N = 100 players organized on a
scale-free network. Figures 6A and 6B show that all players are attracted by full defection
(EGN) and full cooperation (SR-EGN), respectively. The same scheme has been used to
investigate the marginal case βv = kv in the T-driven (Figure 6C) and P-driven (Figure
6D) games. In the first case, some players are attracted by full cooperation and some
others by full defection, while in the second we observe the presence of an attracting line
of partially cooperative steady states, where all players share the same level of coopera-
tion. In this case, the different level reached depends on the initial conditions.
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